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Abstract -The number of web services available on the Internet 
has grown rapidly. Service consumers face a hard decision over 
which service to choose among the available ones. Security holds 
a key after various vulnerabilities have been exploited by 
attackers on number of notable web services. This paper carries 
out a survey on how security has been expressed and promised 
for web services, through both the Web Service Description 
Language and Service Level Agreements. It reviews existing 
technologies used for comparing individual web services, as well 
as for service compositions. Taking security into account further 
complicates the already difficult process of choosing the right 
service. The paper reveals that despite existing efforts, a 
quantitative solution needs to be established urgently in order to 
help service consumers to choose the most secure service for them 
to use. 
Index Terms—Web Service Security, Service Composition, 
Service Level Agreement, Quantitative Security Attribute.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the digital world, a service is defined as a software unit 
that provides certain functionalities. A web service is a service 
that is made remotely available to other entities through 
networks. By using standard communication protocols and 
languages, web services provide the necessary interfaces so 
that any system can invoke them remotely. Moreover, through 
careful design, web services can work together in an ad-hoc 
manner in order to provide new applications that formed by 
one or more web services. The Service-Oriented Architecture 
(SOA) concept provides designs and frameworks to offer 
services as self-contained units [1]. One can invoke a web 
service, as long as the input satisfies the interface 
specifications, and let the output of the web service to be an 
input for another service. In this way new service compositions 
are formed by letting the web services communicate with each 
other. The most commonly used communication protocol for 
exchanging information between web services is Simple Object 
Access Protocol (SOAP) [2]. SOA platforms provide a 
foundation for modelling new service compositions, which 
involves planning, searching for, connecting, and invoking web 
services.  
One of the issues faced by a service consumer is to choose 
a right service from potentially a very large service pool. 
Services provided by different providers may offer the similar 
functionality, but they could be very different in terms of cost, 
quality, or security. Therefore the service consumer faces the 
dilemma of picking up the most suitable services for his/her 
purpose. In this paper we review the existing methods that have 
been used to quantify and compare web services. In particular, 
we consider security as our top priority since most of the works 
to date focus on the quality of the services. There are two folds 
of research: the first is to compare individual web services; the 
second is to evaluate the service compositions. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next 
section explains how web service security has been expressed 
in the past and the challenges service consumers are facing.  
Section III reviews existing techniques used for describing 
security properties for individual web services and the methods 
used for their comparisons. The differences service 
composition has brought to this issue are analysed in Section 
IV. Finally the paper concludes with a brief analysis of future 
directions in Section V.  
II. WEB SERVICE SECURITY  
Like any other entity exposed to the Internet, security is a 
big threat to web services. There are many incidents happened 
to a number of rather high-profile web service providers such 
as eBay and Apple in recent years. Therefore service 
consumers have to seek assurance from the service providers 
for the security and privacy of their data, before using the 
services. This is particularly paramount to organizations using 
web services, as the security is not just vital to their businesses, 
but also regulated by authorities. As we mentioned earlier, 
since many web services offered in the market have similar 
functionality, to some extent security could play the key role in  
helping service consumer to make the decision on which 
service to use. Therefore it is important that the security 
solutions employed by the service provider are both 
measurable and auditable by the service consumer. In this 
section, we first explain how the security attributes are 
expressed for web services.  
A. Security requirements and SLAs 
Web services are normally made available together with a 
service-level agreement (SLA) [3]. A SLA is a formal 
guarantee that has to be accepted by service consumers before 
the service being used. A SLA can specify the properties of a 
service across different levels. For example, on business level it 
can describe what kind of functionality the service is offering 
and how the users will be charged (cost); on technical level it 
may describe the number of shutdowns the service might 
experience each year, i.e. the Quality of Service (QoS).  
Security can also be promised as part of the SLA. However 
its coverage is rather poor to date due to the lack of well 
defined semantics. The SLAs traditionally focus on the QoS 
metrics such as a bandwidth guarantee and backup strategy. 
Even when the security being mentioned, in practice it tends to 
be written in a natural language with fuzzy terms such as 
‘High’, ‘Good’, and etc. Therefore it is very difficult for the 
service consumer to really understand the situation and 
compare the web services from the security perspective. 
Nevertheless some works have been done in order to address 
this issue as we will explain in the next section. Here we just 
show an example schema from the paper [12], which extends 
the standard WS-Agreement [31] schema to cover the security 
requirements. 
Table 1 SLA Schema for data retention requirement  
 
 
Table 1 shows how we could specify the security 
requirement on data retention in an SLA. There are five 
possible outcomes: 
• no−retention: The consumer’s data will not be 
retained by the service. 
• stated−purpose: Data will be discarded at the earliest 
time possible.  
• legal−requirement: Data retained as required by law 
or liability under applicable law. 
• business−practices: Data retained according to the 
service provider’s business practices, with an explicit 
destruction time table.  
• indefinitely: literally no guarantee about data retention 
and discard. 
Table 2 WSDL and WS-SecurityPolicy example 
 
B. WSDL and WS-SecurityPolicy 
Apart from the SLAs, a web service also describes its 
interfaces through a Web Service Description Language 
(WSDL). A WSDL file specifies how to invoke the service, i.e. 
the input parameters in order to communicate with the service 
<wsdl:definitions 
targetNamespace="http://ws.sosnoski.com/library/w
sdl"...> 
   
  <wsp:Policy wsu:Id="UsernameToken" 
xmlns:wsp="http://www.w3.org/ns/ws-policy"...> 
    <sp:SupportingTokens> 
      <wsp:Policy> 
        <sp:UsernameToken 
sp:IncludeToken=".../IncludeToken/AlwaysToRecipie
nt"> 
          <wsp:Policy> 
            <sp:HashPassword/> 
          </wsp:Policy> 
        </sp:UsernameToken> 
      </wsp:Policy> 
    </sp:SupportingTokens> 
  </wsp:Policy> 
   
  <wsp:Policy wsu:Id="SymmEncr" 
xmlns:wsp="http://www.w3.org/ns/ws-policy"...> 
    <sp:SymmetricBinding> 
      <wsp:Policy> 
        <sp:ProtectionToken> 
          <wsp:Policy> 
            <sp:X509Token 
sp:IncludeToken=".../IncludeToken/Never"> 
              ... 
            </sp:X509Token> 
          </wsp:Policy> 
        </sp:ProtectionToken> 
        ... 
      </wsp:Policy> 
    </sp:SymmetricBinding> 
    ... 
  </wsp:Policy> 
   ... 
  <wsdl:binding name="LibrarySoapBinding" 
type="wns:Library"> 
    <wsp:PolicyReference 
xmlns:wsp="http://www.w3.org/ns/ws-policy" 
        URI="#UsernameToken"/> 
    ... 
    <wsdl:operation name="getBook"> 
      <wsp:PolicyReference 
xmlns:wsp="http://www.w3.org/ns/ws-policy" 
          URI="#SymmEncr"/> 
      <wsdlsoap:operation 
soapAction="urn:getBook"/> 
      <wsdl:input name="getBookRequest"> 
        <wsdlsoap:body use="literal"/> 
      </wsdl:input> 
      <wsdl:output name="getBookResponse"> 
        <wsdlsoap:body use="literal"/> 
      </wsdl:output> 
    </wsdl:operation> 
  </wsdl:binding> 
  ... 
</wsdl:definitions> 
 
and the expected output for each of the operations provided by 
the service. The file can be generated automatically by 
programs from the web service. Based on the WSDL 
specification files, a service consumer can design his/her 
service composition accordingly and use SOAP to call the 
operations listed in the WSDL files. 
Although WSDL is mostly used to specify the functional 
aspects of a service, it is possible to attach non-functional 
properties such as security to the WSDL. WS-SecurityPolicy 
[32] is an extension to WSDL to secure SOAP messages. It 
utilises standards like SAML [28], XML Signature [29] and 
XML Encryption [30] to achieve the goal of secure 
communications with web services. WS-SecurityPolicy is 
different from the SSL (Secure Socket Layer) protocol as the 
WS-SecurityPolicy only encrypts the content of a SOAP 
message while SSL can encrypt the entire communication 
channel. Comparing to SSL, WS-SecurityPolicy is more 
flexible as it can choose which part of the SOAP message to be 
encrypted by using which cryptographic algorithm. WS-
SecurityPoliy is attached to the WSDL by declaring itself in the 
WSDL file. An example of WS-Security and its application in 
a WSDL file is presented in Table 2 [22]. 
In this example, there are two security elements: 
UsernameToken and SymmEncr (Symmetric Encryption). 
When they are referred in the WSDL, the UsernameToken is 
required at the <wsdl:binding> level, and the SymmEnrc is 
only required by the getBook operation. This shows how WS-
SecurityPolicy can be enforced at different levels in a WSDL 
file. More details about the WS-SecurityPolicy can be found in 
[23]. 
C. Challenges 
Despite of the introductions of SLA and WSDL, security 
remains a big challenge for web services. One service 
developed with good faith in its security may not be necessarily 
good enough for another to use. The dilemmas faced by a 
service consumer are in three folds. 
• Firstly, security is a broad concept that includes many 
aspects such as confidentiality and privacy. One 
service may be stronger than another in terms of 
confidentiality; while it is also possible that the very 
same service has weaker protection of privacy.  It is a 
typical multi-criteria issue, which service consumers 
are not always in the position to resolve due to the lack 
of expertise. 
• Secondly, WS-SecurityPolicy was proposed to secure 
the SOAP messages. It is well equipped for - but also 
limited to – the security of communication with web 
services. Security requirements at higher levels, such 
as the data retention issue mentioned in Table 1, are 
hard to express by using WS-SecuirtyPolicy. In 
contrast, security descriptions in SLAs are more open 
and inclusive but not always precise. It lacks a widely 
accepted standard to help understand the real strength 
of the security solution that a service is offering. In 
some cases security attributes are expressed by fuzzy 
languages such as “High”, “Good”, “Fair” and etc, 
which makes the comparison of different security 
attributes very difficult. Moreover, the situation gets 
even more complicated when more than one SLA 
languages are used by different service providers.   
• Finally, even though some security modelling and 
verification techniques allow the service consumer to 
specify certain security properties that the service has 
to comply with before the service being used [4], in 
practice the number of services that satisfy the security 
requirements could still be very large. Therefore the 
service consumer still needs help to make the right 
choice from a potentially very large pool of services.  
In summary, WS-SecurityPolicy is not inclusive enough to 
express security requirements other than communication needs. 
SLAs, on the other hand, are flexible but need a carefully 
designed schema and ontology to express security in a clear 
and precise fashion. Even if this can be addressed, service 
consumers still need a straightforward solution to compare and 
pick up the right services to maximise the security. In the next 
two sections we will look at existing efforts in attempting to 
solve these problems for individual web services and service 
compositions respectively. 
III. COMPARING INDIVIDUAL WEB SERVICES 
A. Expressing Security in SLAs 
As we already explained the SLAs are more flexible in 
terms of defining complex security requirements. The problem 
with SLAs is the lack of a common ground for the definition 
and interpretation of security. Crucially this makes it very 
difficult to make the SLAs machine readable. Some works 
have been done in the past in order to express the security 
attirbutes of web services in the SLAs and help the consumers 
to compare the web services in an automatic way. 
Paper [7] was among the first works trying to address the 
quantifiable security issue in SLAs. Basically it tries to express 
and measure the security of a service by associating it with 
performance related metrics. For example, a security 
requirement of “restore backed up data” is measured by the 
quantifiable metric of “data restored 95% of time within 
response time”. The way the security has been expressed is 
rather subjective, depending on the scenario of each enterprise, 
where the research was targeting. Therefore the process cannot 
be implemented automatically. Instead, it requires a close study 
of the enterprise’s configurations by security specialists. 
SecAg is another framework proposed to express security 
metrics in SLAs [9][10]. Similar to the method used in Table 1, 
SecAg also extends the standard WS-Agreement to provide 
necessary semantics for specifying security properties. For 
example, with the extensions it can specify which service level 
objective (SLO) is auditable and assign an access control list to 
the SLO. Based on the extensions, the author also proposed a 
risk-based approach for service matchmaking. Each SLO is 
assigned a weight w representing the risk that the SLO is not 
fulfilled. By calculating the weighted Euclidean distance of 
each SLA to the security requirements, using techniques such 
as a text similarity analyser, the SLA that is closest to the 
security requirements will be selected as the risk is at the 
minimum.  
For cloud consumers, before employing any cloud service 
they have to make sure that the service is compliant with their 
security requirements. In addition, business users seek for 
assurance that the cloud service they use comply with both 
industrial standards and government legislations. 
Unfortunately, SLAs often are not rich enough or directly 
linked with such legislations or standards, in order to support 
an automatic compliance check. Paper [13] tried to solve the 
issue by proposing a compliance vocabulary to embed security 
controls in the SLAs of cloud services. This vocabulary is 
associated with the security controls from governance 
documents. Therefore the SLAs become more transparent to 
the consumers in terms of the level of security being offered. 
Maintenance of such vocabulary is a challenging task though. 
B. Ranking the Web Services 
After expressing the security in the SLAs, it is still 
necessary to compare and rank the web services based on the 
consumer’s requirements. In the past the focus was on raking 
web services based on just their QoS metrics and trying to find 
the best match. We analyse each of them and consider how to 
fit security into the existing ranking strategies.  
Paper [19] proposed a Web Service Relevancy Function 
(WsRF) to measure the relevancy ranking of a particular web 
service based on the user’s preferences (weights) and the QoS 
metrics such as Response Time, Throughput, Availability and 
Cost. It uses a simple mathematical matrix to normalize the 
QoS metrics of web services. The method is suitable for QoS 
metrics that have real numbers. However as security is often 
described by fuzzy terms, the application of this method is 
limited. Similarly, paper [20] uses a Singular Value 
Decomposition (SVD) based technique, and a user assisted 
weighting system to find higher order correlations among web 
services. This enables the selection of web services without an 
exact match of required QoS attributes. 
Paper [21] ranks web services under multi-criteria 
matching. It targets at accurate web service selection and 
assigns a dominance score to each advertised web service. 
Security unfortunately was not the research focus. Other 
similar works include paper [18], which defines a business-
focused ontology to enable semantic matchmaking in open 
cloud markets. 
Paper [17] proposed the concept of Quality of Security 
Service. It treats the security as part of QoS requirements. The 
author argues that security requirements such as the strength of 
a cryptographic algorithm, the length of a cryptographic keys, 
security functions, confidence of policy-enforcement and the 
robustness of an authentication mechanism would all be 
specified and measured as the quality of security services. 
However no explicit example was given in the paper. 
Paper [11] proposed an AHP (Analytic Hierarchy Process) 
based framework for web service quality evaluation. It uses a 
quality meta-model to format SLAs and assigns weights to 
different quality characteristics based their importance. The 
web services are measured by a satisfaction function, which 
covers both measurable and non-measurable characteristics. 
For example, the property of Confidentiality is measured by 
combining the encryption algorithm, key length and key 
protection used. The web service that has the greatest value in 
satisfaction function will be chosen. 
Paper [15] proposes a method for finding semantically 
equal SLA elements from different SLAs by utilizing several 
machine learning algorithms. The user requirements are 
specified in a SLA template, which are compared to different 
SLAs offered by various service providers. The offered SLAs 
can be specified in different languages. This method tries to 
map the elements in different SLAs and generates an 
equivalence probability score. The cloud service that has the 
highest score will be selected for the users automatically.  
IV. COMPARING SERVICE COMPOSITIONS 
A. Service Composition and SLAs 
An important feature of SOA is that the web services can be 
composed together to form new applications. A service 
composition is also a web service, but consists more than one 
individual services. The structure of the composition decides its 
functionality and internal process. For example, a Travel 
Planner service composition includes four individual services 
of GPS, Map, Route and Payment as shown in Figure 1. With 
this service composition, a traveler can specify point of interest 
(POI) through his/her mobile phones. The Travel Planner 
service will provide Route service, after invoking GPS and 
Map services respectively. At the end of the process the Travel 
Planner could also provide a Payment service for purchasing 
tickets for transportation or visiting the POI. Here the 
symbol means the GPS service and Map service are 
executed in parallel. 
 
Figure 1 Travel Planner service composition 
In contrast to individual web services, a service 
composition may not have a dedicated WSDL as the interfaces 
to invoke the composition are provided separately by the 
individual services, which serve as entry points to the 
composition. When it comes to the SLAs, it is possible that a 
service composition may provide a SLA to the service 
consumer on request, but the real questions is what should be 
included in the SLA and how to assure it. The situation is more 
complex simply because in many cases the service 
compositions are maintained in an ad-hoc manner, i.e. 
individual services join and leave a composition at runtime, due 
to various reasons. For example, a service may encounter an 
error and be replaced by another service to maintain the 
functionality of the entire composition. Therefore the properties 
of the composition can be changed at runtime. It then becomes 
a question that how the SLA can be honoured or updated at 
runtime to reflect the change of composition. In respect to 
security, it is very hard to guarantee that the new service 
composition will always comply with the consumer’s security 
requirements.  
 Figure 2 Composition of three services 
 To further illustrate the problem, taking the example in 
Figure 2, which demonstrates a scenario where services A, B, 
and C are composed in a sequence order. The three services 
support different cryptographic algorithms and have to use the 
commonly supported Blowfish [24] for secure communications 
with each other in the composition. Suppose that later on 
vulnerability has been found with service B and it has to be 
replaced by another service B’. However, it transpires that the 
only common algorithm supported by B’, A and C is 3DES 
[25]. Thus the security properties offered by the entire 
composition is consequently changed from Blowfish to 3DES, 
and the situation could be much worse if no common algorithm 
is found at all in this case.  
To solve the SLAs maintenance issue, paper [16] argues 
that a service broker’s role is necessary. The broker analyses 
the needs of the service consumers and helps to select and 
compose the individual services into new compositions 
required.  As shown in Figure 3, it gives a very good example 
about what needs to be covered in the SLAs for a composed 
online meeting service, which has four individual services: 
VOICE, MSG, PRESENCE, and CONF. Furthermore, paper 
[12] proposed a scheme to let the service broker bridge the 
security requirements from service consumers and the security 
guarantees promised by service providers. The broker is in 
charge of compositing web services and maintaining a 
mutually agreed contract. As we already mentioned in Table 1, 
this work uses a schema that is based on the WS-Agreement. 
B. Ranking Service Compositions 
To make sure that a service composition always satisfies its 
consumer’s requirements, constant analysis and monitoring of 
the composition are essential, which necessitates quantitative 
calculations and comparisons of the security attributes of 
service compositions. Because the service compositions are 
offered at runtime, its security properties need to be determined 
in real time as well. Ranking service compositions is different 
from ranking individual services as it must consider the 
structure of the service compositions and make 
recommendations to the consumers with the maximum 
security. Some previous works tried to calculate the properties 
of a service composition by taking its structure into account.  
 
Figure 3 SLA for an Online Meeting Service Composition 
Paper [14] targets a business process with service 
composition in mind. It proposed the idea of Quality of 
Protection (QoP), in contrast to the traditional QoS. The QoP 
emphasises on properties that relate to security, such as 
incident recovery time, backup frequency etc. It does not cover 
security requirements beyond the basic level nor mention how 
to aggregate QoP properties when services are composed 
together. 
Paper [6] focuses on the QoS values of service 
composition. It determines the QoS values based on the 
structure of the services, i.e. looking at their relationships. 
Based on the process sequence such as loop, and, or, etc, the 
QoS values are calculated based on predefined rules. For 
example, in a sequential process, the execution time of a 
service composition is calculated as the sum of each individual 
service’s execution time; while in the case of a parallel process, 
it would be the maximum execution time of all the individual 
services involved. This work is very useful but it does not 
consider the security attributes of service compositions. 
Paper [26] uses a similar method but the focus is on the 
trustworthiness of service composition. It also uses the 
structure of service composition to decide its property’s value. 
The authors argue that the trustworthiness value  of a service 
composition is a combined result of relevant properties such as 
reputation, reliability and availability etc. These properties are 
one step closer towards the general security properties targeted 
in this paper. 
Aniketos is an EU-funded FP7 project which solves 
security issues in service composition [27]. It adopts the 
concept of a service broker and uses Business Process Model 
and Notation (BPMN) [33] to construct service composition, as 
the example shown in Figure 1. The ranking of service 
compositions in Aniketos is based on verifiable security 
properties, such as Separation of Duty and Binding of Duty in 
compliance with the Role Based Access Control (RBAC). For 
example, Separation of Duty means that two services in a 
composition cannot be executed by the same role. Aniketos 
also checks for harmful functionalities by using byte code 
verification, as well as the security specifications embedded 
into the WSDL file of each individual service. The security 
properties verified in Aniketos are mostly binaries, i.e. the 
verification module returns a result of either True or False. It 
works well if we only want to know if a service composition 
satisfies the a consumer’s security requirements. However, 
when the service pool is getting larger, it would be useful if the 
services can be compared and ranked in a more fine-grained 
manner. 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK  
The Internet becomes a world full of web services. There 
are already some service repositories that can store and offer a 
wide range of web services to service consumers, who can pick 
up a service or form a service composition straightaway under 
the SOA framework.  
However, comparing and choosing the most appropriate 
services is not easy, especially when the security of the services 
is considered in the process. First of all, neither WSDL nor 
SLA describes security properties of web services in a 
consistent and precise manner due to the lack of presence of 
security in these files in the past. Secondly, comparing security 
properties is a multi-criteria problem that requires more efforts 
to resolve. Finally, determining the security properties of a 
service composition is difficult as the quantitative evaluation 
has to be carried out in real time and take the structure of the 
composition into account. 
In this paper, we conducted a brief survey of the existing 
ranking techniques used to compare both individual services 
and service compositions, and concluded that a quantitative 
evaluation method is urgently needed in order to solve the 
issue.  As a future work we plan to target the comparison of 
individual services first. It will be based on linguistic 
evaluation of those fuzzy terms already exist in SLAs in order 
to make immediate impact on real world scenarios. 
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